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1. Overview  
Households and individuals make decisions every day that directly impact on their health and 
nutrition outcomes, which are influenced by many factors, including social norms, myths and 
misinformation, impulsivity and procrastination, and the country context they live in (Ashton et al, 
2015, p. 7; Luoto, 2017, p. 1). Behavioural economics/insights can help explain this decision 
making and create an environment in which people make choices that are better aligned with 
their aspirations, objectives, and perceived welfare
1
 (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 8). Interventions 
might involve supplying the correct information, refraining existing information, streamlining 
choices, or facilitating commitment to a welfare-enhancing decision
2
 (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 11). 
Insights from behavioural economics have mainly been applied in high income countries but are 
now being applied in a variety of low- and middle-income settings to improve health behaviours 
(Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 748). This rapid review looks at available literature on the application of 
behavioural economics/insights to health- and nutrition-related matters in low and middle income 
countries, focusing primarily on interventions relating to reproductive health, child health, and 
child nutrition. 
Tools from behavioural economics/insights generally fall under strategically employed financial 
incentives and decision tricks or “nudges” and include: defaults; reminders; framing; commitment 
devices; labelling; micro incentives; social influences; timing and salience of information; identity 
priming; and simplification. Various studies have suggested that commitment devices, material 
incentives, framing, social influences, and defaults have been particularly effective in 
encouraging decision making leading to healthy behaviour around reproductive health and child 
health and nutrition (Ashraf, 2013; Trujillo et al, 2015; Ashton et al, 2015).  
Luoto (2017, p. 168) finds that the evidence base for the potential of behavioural economics to 
address health problems in low and middle income countries is mostly made up of small-scale 
randomised field studies. The ability of behavioural economics to ‘change behaviours at the level 
of general populations or to achieve long-term sustained behaviour change remains largely 
unanswered’ (Luoto, 2017, p. 168). Much less literature appeared to focus on child health and 
nutrition than on reproductive health, and more studies referred to using behavioural economics 
than behavioural insights. Some of the literature offered more suggestions as to the potential of 
behavioural economics/insights for addressing maternal and child health problems than concrete 
examples of where it has been used effectively.     
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 In contrast with social and behaviour change communication, behavioural economics ‘does not seek to modify 
personal or cultural values, or to impose judgment on which beliefs or preferences are best’ (Ashton et al, 2015, 
p. 11). 
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 It should be noted that interventions which target only behavioural problems are unlikely to change outcomes in 
contexts where there is no access to affordable health services (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 8). In addition, ‘in the 
context of deeply rooted poverty, women’s economic dependency, inadequate health systems, and constrained 
care options, even good choices can result in bad outcomes’ (Kruk et al, 2016, p. 2301).  
3 
2. Behavioural economics/insights  
Behavioural economics examines systematic behavioural biases and why individuals make 
decisions that potentially compromise their own future wellbeing and the welfare of others 
(Ashton et al, 2015, p. 4, 7). Behavioural economics ‘focuses on how context and social and 
physical environments influence and constrain human behaviour, often more than we realise’ 
(Luoto & Carman, 2014, p. 2). Behavioural insights more broadly refer to the ‘use of findings from 
behavioural science to understand how people behave in practice’ (Hallsworth et al, 2016, p. 10). 
It can be used to reassess, rethink and redesign whole health systems (Hallsworth et al, 2016, p. 
11).  
Ashton et al (2015, p. 4-5) identify four sets of opposing forces which influence peoples decision 
making around health
3
.  
 ‘Illusion  Reality: People make decisions based on what they believe to be true, 
hinging on their own experiences, reference points, or estimates—rather than what is 
objectively or measurably true. Couples may choose not to use a modern method 
because they believe it causes infertility or disease, or because they underestimate the 
probability of becoming pregnant.’ 
 ‘Self  Other: Individuals are sometimes influenced by others’ interests, or by social 
norms or expectations. For example, even when a woman prefers to deliver in a clinic or 
hospital, she may forego the opportunity due to the expectations of her partner, family, 
or community. Similarly, a couple may not desire a large family, but may have additional 
children to conform to social identities or norms.’ 
 ‘Thinking fast  Thinking slow: Cognition is a limited resource, and people living in 
poverty often exhibit a depletion of cognitive capacity due to the complexity and 
unpredictability of daily life. Sometimes individuals select choices that require the least 
mental energy or cognitive cost (often without realising it). Busy providers may 
recommend a contraceptive method because they have prior experience with it, which 
could result in a different recommendation than processing all of the information 
available about different methods to make the best decision for their patient’s individual 
needs.’ 
 ‘Today  Tomorrow: Every day individuals face a trade-off between costs today and 
costs tomorrow. For example, a woman may delay the cost (or effort/time required) of 
going to a clinic today, perceiving the cost to be lower tomorrow. However, repeating this 
decision results in procrastination and it underweights the high costs of pregnancy 
complications in the future.’4 
A number of evidence based tools from behavioural economics have been developed to help 
individuals make better decisions in light of these opposing forces, although many have not been 
researched or evaluated in relation to reproductive health and family planning, and some can 
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 See also Luoto and Carman (2014) for examples of the implications of behavioural economics concepts of 
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded selfishness in relation to health interventions and Luoto 
(2017) for examples of behavioural explanations of health decision making in low- and middle-income countries.  
4
 More examples of how behavioural biases may affect decision making around reproductive health can be found 
in Ashton et al (2015, p. 16-25). See also Ashraf (2013) and Chhabra et al (2015) for other decision making 
around health examples.  
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also have negative consequences – see Table 1 below for a summary of the tools (Ashton et al, 
2015, p. 5)
5
. Generally they fall under strategically employed financial incentives and decision 
tricks or “nudges” (Buttenheim & Asch, 2013, p. 582). These tools aim to make it easy for people 
to make good health decisions and harder to make poor ones (Buttenheim & Asch, 2013, p. 582; 
Ashraf, 2013, p. 3).  
Behavioural economics/insights is suggested to affect policy design in three stages by: ‘defining 
a relevant problem; diagnosing the relevant behavioural barrier(s) that result(s) in the given 
problem, and designing a solution to the problem that is built on how people actually behave 
(versus how they should behave)’ (Luoto & Carman, 2014, p. 40; Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 
3). Hallsworth et al (2016, p. 4-5) suggest that a simple way to apply behavioural insights to 
policy, and hence making behavioural change more likely, is to use the Easy, Attractive, Social 
and Timely (EAST) framework. This involves: i) reducing even very small barriers to make 
healthy behaviour more likely; ii) creating simple and clear messages, or new design features, to 
attract our limited attention; iii) showing or telling people that others are performing a healthy 
behaviour; and iv) launching interventions at times when people are most receptive to change 
(Hallsworth et al, 2016, p. 4-5). Datta and Mullainathan (2012, p. 16-26) also offer a number of 
behavioural design principles, based on behavioural insights into decision making tendencies, 
which can make interventions more effective, including: i) facilitate self-control by employing 
commitment devices; ii) reduce the need for self-control; iii) remove snags to choosing; iv) use 
micro-incentives; v) reduce inattention through reminders and implementation intentions; vi) 
maximise the impact of messaging through framing effects, social comparisons, norms; and vii) 
frame messages to match mental models (see also Luoto & Carman, 2014, p. 51- 54). The 
importance of trialling and evaluating interventions has also been emphasised (Hallsworth et al, 
2016, p. 5; Luoto & Carman, 2014, p. 56; Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 3).  
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 Untested examples of how these tools could be used in a reproductive health context can be found in Ashton et 
al (2015, p. 5-6). See also Buttenheim & Asch (2013), Chhabra et al (2015, p. 15-24), and Kruk et al (2016, p. 
2302) for examples of potential uses of behavioural economics in maternal and new-born health. Taylor & 
Buttenheim (2013) also provide examples of the potential uses of behavioural economics tools in the prevention 
of mother to child HIV transmission. 
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Table 1: Tools from behavioural economics 
Tool  Description 
Defaults The option an individual will receive if he or she does not make an 
active choice. A carefully chosen default can help overcome problems 
like procrastination, complex and confusing choices, social pressures, 
or the cognitive costs of decision-making. 
Reminders Reminders can help decrease the cognitive burden required to 
sequence or complete a complex task. 
Framing The language used to describe a set of choices can shape people’s 
decision-making. Framing can help when people misperceive risks, by 
making certain outcomes more salient than others. 
Commitment 
Devices 
Pre-committing to a particular decision can help people align their 
actions with their preferences. This helps with procrastination, social 
pressures, and present bias. 
Labelling Exploiting an individual’s “mental accounting” to encourage spending 
on investment goods that will benefit his or her own welfare. 
Micro Incentives Token rewards, particularly those creating social recognition or 
salience, can be more motivating than the monetary value of the 
reward. 
Social Influences Harnessing social norms or pressures to encourage beneficial 
decision-making can be used to overcome biases in decision-making. 
Timing and Salience 
of Information 
People may process complex information more effectively if the 
information is presented in a targeted way, at a specific time, or 
through a particular agent. 
Identity Priming Increasing the saliency of an individual’s gender, race, or role can be 
used to make certain choices (and their consequences) more salient 
Simplification Making the terms/consequences of a decision more clearly understood, 
at the correct moment in time, can reduce the biases and cognitive 
costs of decision-making. 
Source: Ashton et al (2015, p. 5-6)  
Trujillo et al (2015, p. 749) suggest that behavioural economics interventions may be useful in 
treatment seeking behaviours, health professional behaviours, patient compliance behaviours 
and lifestyle and prevention behaviours.  
Ashraf (2013, p. 3) suggests that commitment devices, material incentives, and defaults have 
been particularly effective in addressing present bias
6
 and limited attention. Principles from 
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 Present bias ‘describes our tendency to overvalue the present and discount the future’, benefits seem more 
valuable in the present than we imagine they will be in the future, while costs seem greater today than we 
imagine they will be tomorrow (Ashraf, 2013, p. 3).   
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behavioural economics have been successfully applied in randomised trials to improve smoking 
cessation, medication adherence, exercise and weight loss, and organ donations (Ashton et al, 
2015, p. 9; Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 2; Luoto & Carman, 2014, p. 27-38). These studies 
have mostly been implemented in higher income countries, although experiments are 
increasingly being adapted for low- and middle-income settings (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 9; Luoto, 
2017, p. 158; Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 5). Luoto (2017, p. 159) finds that the evidence base 
for the promise of behavioural economics in low- and-middle income countries is still 
predominately made up of small-scale randomised controlled trials, with policy interventions or 
scaled approaches based on behavioural economics principles few and far between, as 
elsewhere. There are criticisms that the effect sizes from behavioural economics or “nudge” 
polices are inadequate compared to the scale of the problem and that more traditional 
approaches may produce the largest impacts in the shortest amount of time (Luoto, 2017, p. 159; 
Luoto & Carman, 2014, p. 4). On the other hand, Luoto (2017, p. 162, 168) finds that despite 
their successes, traditional approaches have generally fallen short of the scale of health 
behaviour changes needed, due perhaps to being based on the rational model, and that insights 
from behavioural economics could be a positive addition. However, Johnston (2016, p. 111) 
argues that behavioural economics ‘does not recognise the role of systemic (rather than 
individual) factors in explaining poor health, which are diverse, specific to particular health 
conditions, and in some cases deeply political’.           
3. Behavioural economics/insights and reproductive health 
Ashton et al (2015, p. 26-35) prepared a review summarising opportunities for the application of 
behavioural economics in relation to reproductive health and family planning in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. They see a considerable scope for applying the tools of behavioural 
economics to reproductive health (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 36). They suggest that specific 
opportunities for behavioural economics tools in reproductive health interventions include 
correcting wrong beliefs, changing norms, making family planning easy, and motivating service 
providers (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 35-36).  
However they note that there has been relatively little application of behavioural economics to 
reproductive health challenges in developing countries (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 8, 26). Ashton et al 
(2015, p. 36) also warn that due to unique issues that do not necessarily appear in other domains 
of economics or health, including power inequalities across gender and age and the risks of 
coercion, ‘earlier work in behavioural economics may not directly translate to reproductive 
health’. Religious and personal reasons, which lead to deeply held beliefs or powerful social 
forces, can drive family planning decisions, while the reasons connected to non-use of medical 
care often involve economic and geographical barriers or lack of information (Chowdhury et al, 
2013, p. 18). 
When looking at the health policy recommendations emanating from behavioural economics 
principles relevant to low- and middle-income country settings, Trujillo et al (2015, p. 747) found
7
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 Used a vignette-based online survey to assess the opinions of 520 policymakers and practitioners around the 
world about health policy recommendations emanating from behavioural economics principles that are relevant to 
low- and middle-income country settings (Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 747). However, there are concerns over the 
generalisability of the findings as the survey was sent to the 6535 subscribers of the Center for Global 
Development’s (CGD) global health newsletter and only 8 per cent replied (Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 479). The 
survey sample is representative of the CGD pool (Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 479). 
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‘strong support for health policies based on the concepts of framing choices to overcome present 
bias; providing periodic information to form habits; and messaging to promote social norms’ from 
policymakers and practitioners (see also Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 23). However, there was 
‘less support for policies which use cash rewards as extrinsic motivators either to change 
individual behaviour related to the management of chronic conditions or to mitigate risky sexual 
behaviour’ as a result of normative concerns and perceived lack of effectiveness of such 
interventions (Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 747). This is despite a number of studies which showed the 
effectiveness of using monetary rewards to reduce risky sexual behaviour (Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 
753).  
Examples of the use of behavioural economics/insights in 
reproductive health interventions  
Incentives 
Conditional cash transfers, which can sometimes act as financial incentives for behaviour 
change, ‘have been effective in increasing the use of contraception, delaying marriage, and 
increasing the use of antenatal care and facility-based delivery’ (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 28; WDR 
team, 2015, p. 151). In Nepal, the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme, which paid health workers 
for each attending patient and patients for using the services, reduced the probability of women 
delivering at home and increased the use of skilled attendance at delivery (Johnston, 2016, p. 
110). A programme using similar incentives in India, the Janani Suraksha Yojana programme, 
increased the uptake of antenatal care, substantially increasing the proportion of women giving 
birth in health facilities (Johnston, 2016, p. 110; Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 3). The incentive 
scheme was also linked with a 3.7 reduction in perinatal deaths per 1000 pregnancies and a 
reduction of 2.3 neonatal deaths per 1000 live births (Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 3). 
Conditional cash transfers have also proven to be effective in increasing utilisation of preventive 
health-care services and improving nutrition and some health outcomes (Trujillo et al, 2015, p. 
750).  
The use of incentives resulted in higher rates of follow-up visits for IUDs among women who 
received incentives to make a follow-up visit in a study in India (Chowdhury et al, 2013, p. 25).  
Women were given vouchers for motorcycle transport to clinic appointments and vouchers for 
medical providers to address the supply side problems of access to maternal health services in 
Uganda, which included geographical inaccessibility, lack of transport, and financial burdens 
(Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 4). ‘Initial data showed an increase in antenatal, delivery and 
postnatal care as well as an increase in the number of safe deliveries in the intervention group 
from <200 deliveries/month to over 500 deliveries/month’ (Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 4). 
Trujillo et al (2015, p. 750; see also Johnston, 2016, p. 110) found that ‘experiments in 
behavioural economics indicate that cash incentives structured in small and frequent rewards 
can be effective to overcome present costs (that tend to be highly valued) to obtain long-term 
changes in behaviour’. Johnston’s (2016, p. 111) review of health-incentive transfers, however, 
suggests that there is ‘mixed evidence on their effectiveness, but some programmes do seem to 
have achieved their desired aims’. She also highlights that there are ethical issues around their 
design and concerns about sustainability after the end of an intervention (Johnston, 2016, p. 
111). There may also be unintended negative effects from the use of financial incentives (Luoto 
& Carman, 2014, p. 24-25; Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 6). In addition, Johnston (2016, p. 111) 
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argues that by focusing on poor choices by individuals, such interventions ignore the social and 
economic forces that produce ill-health.      
Labelling and commitment devices 
The technique of labelling has been used in rural Kenya, and it was found that ‘locked savings 
boxes that are labelled (mentally) as “savings for health expenses” have increased women’s 
investment in preventive health’ (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 28). There was also an element of social 
commitment, as when individuals were invited to make deposits into savings accounts labelled 
for health expenditures, those investing in a group setting saved and invested more in preventive 
health compared with those making deposits on their own (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 30). Luoto 
(2017, p. 164) also finds examples of commitment savings accounts to address present bias in a 
variety of low- and middle-income countries.  
The Berhane Hewan programme in Ethiopia involved a public commitment by parents and their 
daughters to delay marriage for at least the duration of the two-year programme (Ashton et al, 
2015, p. 30). Families were also told they would receive a goat upon successful completion of 
the programme, to incentivise participation and offset financial costs of delaying marriage 
(Ashton et al, 2015, p. 30; Luoto, 2017, p. 167). A quasi-experimental evaluation of the 
programme found that it delayed marriage among 10-14 year olds and increased the use of 
family planning services among sexually active and married adolescents (15-19 year olds) 
(Ashton et al, 2015, p. 30).  
Social influences 
The PRACHAR programme in Bihar, India, developed to prevent child marriage and increase 
child spacing, has a component aimed at influencing community and family members and 
instigating pro-social pressure to delay marriage (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 31). A retrospective 
study, with random cluster sampling of participants and a control group, suggests that PRACHAR 
delayed age at marriage and first birth and may have increased the use of contraceptives to 
delay second pregnancy, including among the most economically disadvantaged groups (Ashton 
et al, 2015, p. 31). 
A randomised experiment in Bangladesh, found that ‘conducting community discussions in the 
homes of opinion leaders, at central points in villages’ social networks, was five times more 
effective at increasing take up of modern contraceptives than conventional field worker visits’ 
(Ashton et al, 2015, p. 33).  
A study of a participatory women’s group in Nepal aimed at improving health outcomes, found 
that while only 8 per cent of women of reproductive age and 37 per cent of pregnant women 
joined groups, neonatal mortality rates dropped by 30 per cent and maternal mortality by a factor 
of five (Buttenheim & Asch, 2013, p. 583). Evaluations suggest that spreading of behaviours and 
beliefs beyond the group was an important component of the intervention’s successes 
(Buttenheim & Asch, 2013, p. 583).  
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Timing and salience of information  
There is ‘evidence that Nepali women who receive health education immediately after delivering 
are more likely to use contraception six months later, compared with those who received 
education three months after delivery’ (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 32).  
Examples of interventions aimed at health care providers 
Incentives 
A randomised experiment in Zambia found non-cash incentives for health extension workers to 
be more effective at increasing community-based provision of services than cash (although a 
combination of the two approaches was found to be even more effective) (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 
29). Non-cash incentives in the form of peer recognition were also found to be more effective 
than financial incentives to motivate health extension workers in Zambia to promote and sell 
condoms (Luoto, 2017, p. 165; Ashraf, 2013, p. 6).  
A study in Egypt found that supply-side incentives increased the likelihood of providers asking 
clients about a follow-up family planning visit (Chowdhury et al, 2013, p. 25).  
Social influences 
Harnessing social norms can be beneficial; social prestige or recognition was found in an 
evaluation of BRAC in Bangladesh to be a key determinant in retaining community health 
workers (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 29).  
Interventions like citizen report cards, which equip communities to hold officials and providers 
accountable to them, can increase utilisation of services and, in some cases, increase quality 
(Ashton et al, 2015, p. 32).  
Simplification 
Simplification through task shifting strategies that authorise non-physician providers such as 
midwives, nurses and community based health extension workers, who are often closer to rural 
and marginalised communities, to deliver essential services can mitigate workforce shortages 
and inadequate provider skill mix and has the potential to improve health outcomes (Ashton et al, 
2015, p. 35).  
4. Behavioural economics/insights and child health 
Examples of the use of behavioural economics/insights in child 
health interventions 
Incentives 
The technique of micro incentives was used successfully in India, where offering a bag of lentils, 
equivalent to a half-day’s wages for an agricultural labourer, almost doubled the number of 
women bringing their children to a vaccine camp for immunisations (Ashton et al, 2015, p. 29; 
Luoto, 2017, p. 165; Ashraf, 2013, p. 4). Neutralising present bias through the use of lentils as 
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incentives had a bigger impact than just making immunisations easily available (Ashraf, 2013, p. 
4).  
Framing 
Buttenheim & Asch (2013, p. 582) note that loss frames (emphasising the harms associated from 
not taking an action) have been found to induce stronger intentions to vaccinate children and 
purchase point-of-use water treatment systems, either in place of or when paired with gain 
frames (emphasising the benefits from taking the same action) (see also Datta & Mullainathan, 
2012, p. 24). Although, the WDR team (2015, p. 149) instead found that ‘gain- framed messages 
consistently improved adoption of preventive behaviours (such as vaccinations) when compared 
to loss-framed messages with the same objective information’. 
Commitment devices 
An intervention in India to improve long-term use of insecticide-treated bed nets to prevent 
malaria found higher rates of retreatment of nets and long-term use when households were given 
the option to prepay for a retreatment contract at the time of initial net purchase, compared to 
paying for retreatment as needed (Buttenheim & Asch, 2013, p. 583; Ashraf, 2013, p. 4).  
A study in Kenya and Bangladesh looking at whether ‘nudges’ in the form of marketing 
messages derived from behavioural economics can increase water treatment among poor 
households found that both framing the message and committing with reminders increased water 
treatment in both settings, although usage was higher in Kenya (Luoto et al, 2014, p. 14). 
Defaults 
Waterborne diseases can cause widespread illness, particularly among children, but the usage of 
chlorine tablets that can disinfect water is low in Kenya (Ashraf, 2013, p. 5). Making chlorine use 
the default easy obvious option can make usage go up (Ashraf, 2013, p. 5). A series of 
randomised control trails in western Kenya found that providing free liquid chlorine dispensers at 
local water sources, providing a visual reminder to use it and making it easy to add, along with 
promotion by other community members and other messaging, increased chlorine use by 53 per 
cent (Ashraf, 2013, p. 5; see also Karlan and Appel, 2011, p. 246-249; Datta & Mullainathan, 
2012, p. 20).   
Social influences 
Social influences have been found to be important in a pilot prevention of mother-to-child HIV 
transmission (PMTCT) programme in South Africa (Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 2). Providing 
HIV positive mentor mothers to pregnant women improved their medical follow-up, coping skills 
and HIV knowledge (Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 2). In addition, Taylor and Buttenheim (2013, 
p. 3) argue that the advice of the mentor mothers can come at the right time to play heavily into 
the decision making process of PMTCT patients. However, Taylor and Buttenheim (2013, p. 6) 
also point out that the use of mentors does raise ‘concern for privacy and loss of social 
connectedness through the professionalisation of mentor mothers’. 
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Defaults 
In a number of countries with high HIV aids rates, including Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, South 
Africa and Zambia, health providers specifically recommend an HIV test to patients at antenatal 
clinics, and unless the patient declines, an HIV test is automatically performed (i.e. the default is 
testing and they have to opt out if they do not want it) (Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 4). The 
initiation of routine HIV testing in Botswana increased testing rates from 40 per 1000 persons to 
104 per 1000 persons (Taylor & Buttenheim, 2013, p. 4). 
Social influences  
A series of evaluations found that even small price increases above zero lead to large drops in 
the number of people who choose to buy health products, including products which are very 
beneficial to child health – see figure 1 (WDR team, 2015, p. 150). The WDR team suggests that 
low prices make things affordable, while ‘free may convey a social norm: we all should be doing 
this’8.  
Figure 1: Take up of health products in relation to price 
 
Source: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, 2011 in WRD team (2015, p. 150)  
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 See Karlan & Appel (2011, p. 242-246) for a discussion of the benefits of selling versus giving of bed nets.  
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5. Behavioural economics/insights and child nutrition 
Examples of the use of behavioural economics/insights in child 
nutrition interventions  
Defaults  
The power of defaults can be seen in an example of a child nutrition programme in India (Luoto, 
2017, p. 166). The planned design was that households would only have to tell millers once 
whether they wanted their flour enriched with iron, and that millers would repeat this every time 
they returned, but the millers did the opposite and forced households to specify each time 
whether they wanted iron-fortified flour (Luoto, 2017, p. 167; Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 20). 
The change in default resulted in significant drop-out from the programme and its failure to 
achieve its objective (Luoto, 2017, p. 167; Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 20).  
Datta and Mullainathan (2012, p. 20) found that most nutrition programmes trying to either get 
the poor to eat the types of food that naturally provide a balanced mix of micro- and macro-
nutrients or to adopt special nutritional supplements have very little success. Behavioural insights 
suggest that ‘it might be most effective to make balanced nutrition close to automatic by fortifying 
food that people already eat with extra micronutrients, much as the routine iodisation of salt has 
vastly reduced problems of iodine deficiency’ (Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 21).  
Incentives 
In Mexico, the conditional cash transfer programme Progresa offered cash incentives for making 
use of public clinics, with a focus on targeting low birth weight and child malnutrition (Karlan & 
Appel, 2011, p. 232). A randomised control trial found that 97 per cent of eligible families signed 
up, and enrolled children saw a 23 per cent reduction in illness overall, an 18 per cent drop in the 
incidence of anaemia, and a 1 to 4 per cent increase in height (Karlan & Appel, 2011, p. 233-
234). Another study also found that families were spending an average of 70 per cent of the 
remaining money on increasing the quality and quantity of food available to the household 
(Karlan & Appel, 2011, p. 234).     
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